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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 A STUDY ON CORE COMPETENCE MANAGEMENT 
 
By 
 
 
Lee Han Kyoung 
 
 
     The major objective of this study is to understand the concept and methodology of 
core competence management.  The survival and growth of a company depends on 
competitive advantage, and effective core competence management. By examining the   
related literature and analyzing of the case study of Canon, I explain the importance of core 
competence management as a source of a firm’s competitive advantage and future growth 
potential.  
     Core competence gives companies significant meaning. The company that has a 
systematically structured core competence does not experience difficulties despite the 
changing environment.  Core competence offers long-term and differentiated  advantage 
to companies. In other words, core competence provides companies with the source of true 
competitiveness.  That is why so many companies are investing their resources in 
strengthening their core competence. 
      Korean companies had a tendency to focus on new markets or the attractiveness of 
an industry rather than on the relatedness with the existing business. Unrelated 
diversification could be successful to some extent because the first mover in the new 
market could enjoy some advantage when the industry is in the growing stage and 
competition is restricted.  However, diversification will not be successful if a company 
pursued it only because of the attractiveness of the market at the neglect of systematic core 
competence management. 
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Ⅰ.  Introduction  
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1-1.  Purpose of the Research 
 
     Many Chaebols in Korea were able to grow in a monopolistic market environment  
that was protected by government support without facing severe competition.  The main 
problem was that these Chaebols, rather than specializing in a specific area were investing 
their limited financial and managerial resources in diversified, often unrelated areas, 
without building core competence. 
     Now, in this age of global competition, Korean Chaebols are standing at an important 
turning point. Either they have to find their core competence areas and acquire competitive 
advantage in the specialized fields to effectively meet the global competition, or resort to 
being ruled by those global companies with accumulated core competence. 
     Given this background, this study aims to answer the question of “what is core 
competence” and “how it can be identified”. Then I look at the process of how core 
competence can be established and implemented based on the identified core competence.  
The case of Canon will also be examined to identify the process of core competence 
management. 
 
1-2.  Research Methodology and Structure 
 
This study can be divided into two sections. The first section is a review of previous 
studies on the subject and the second section is a case study.  
In the first section, the basic concept of core competence is explained, then a brief 
summary of studies on the issue by academic scholars is introduced. 
The second section suggests a method of finding core competence, and by applying the 
method in the case study, it provides an empirical analysis on the subject. 
This paper also analyzes the case of Canon to understand best practices in core competence 
management. Finally, the conclusion part explains the significance of this study.  
 
 
 
 
Ⅱ.  Literature Review on Core Competence 
2-1.  The Concept of Core Competence 
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     Competence is particularly important to competitive activities such as business. As a 
result, much of the thinking about business strategy over the last thirty years has been 
about what competencies a business needs to have to compete in a specific market, and 
what markets a business should plan on competing in given its current and potential 
competencies. 
     One of the difficulties of the literature on skill-based management is the range of 
terms writers in this field use to describe their ideas. Similar terms - strengths, skills, 
competencies, capabilities, organizational knowledge, intangible assets - are used 
interchangeably by different authors. Kenneth Andrews uses the term ‘distinctive 
competence’ to define not just what an organization does, but what it does particularly 
well.1 
     C. K. Prahalad and Gary Hamel introduced the phrase ‘core competence’ in their 
landmark article in the Harvard Business Review in 1990. They defined core competence 
as an integrated bundle of skill and technologies; so that managers consider the corporation 
as a collection of competitively important competence which could be used in different 
products and markets.2 
Some authors, wishing to place particular emphasis on ‘collective learning in the 
corporation’ have chosen to use the phrase ‘capability’ or ‘core capability’ as better 
expressing the dynamic learning processes involved. 
What these terms have in common is that they define those unique capabilities, knowledge 
and behavioral routines which are a potential source of an organization’s advantage. 
     The idea that complex internal capabilities are critical to a firm’s success is not new. 
Phillip, Selznick, in his book Leadership in Administration,3 was one of the first writers to 
acknowledge that factors internal to an organization, such as its personnel and its previous 
experiences, are crucial to its chances of success in executing a chosen policy. In essence, 
Selznick argued that in the field of business activity, the past determines the present. 
He states that an organization’s developmental history results in its having ‘special 
limitations and capabilities’- a character, or ‘emergent institutional pattern that decisively 
affects the competence of an organization to frame and execute desired policies’.  
     Selznick called the peculiar character of an organization its ‘distinctive competence’. 
He defined the art of good management as the ability to make a practical assessment of an 
organization’s suitability to its task or strategy. To illustrate this, he gave an example of a 
master boat-building firm that specializes in high quality craftsmanship. The firm’s 
management decided to expand into mass production of low cost speed boats.  
It proved impossible to adapt worker attitudes away from their commitment to quality and 
craftsmanship, and the management was forced to relocate the speed boat production and 
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recruit a separate workforce. 
     The new venture failed because the history and culture of the organization did not fit 
it to the new task. Thus Selznick observed that a ‘distinctive competence’ in one area –
quality craftsmanship–may amount to a ‘distinctive incompetence’ in another–low cost 
mass production. Selznick concluded that internal social forces affect an organization’s 
chances of success as much , if not more, than do the vagaries of the external market place. 
     This conclusion influenced many business policy writers, who saw that strategy 
formulation and opportunity surveillance were useless exercises unless the company had 
either the internal abilities to execute its decisions or at least a good chance of developing 
the required capabilities. With this in mind, Igor Ansoff in his book Corporate Strategy4. 
advocated that managers compile a comprehensive checklist of their firm’s skills and 
resources, a ‘grid of competencies’. Similar grids were to be compiled on competitors, and 
a cross-comparison was to be made of all the results. The profile emerging from this 
exercise would be a ready guide to the relative strengths of competitors already operating 
in a given market. 
     Ansoff proposed that this document, regularly updated, would from a permanent  
reference guide for future strategy decisions and could be used in assessing the likely 
success of diversification. Also writing in the 1960s, joint authors learned, Christensen, 
Andrews and Guth5, influential academics of the Harvard Business School, suggested that 
a company’s competitive strength derived from its ‘distinctive competence’, or what the 
company could do especially well. 
The goal of corporate strategy was to match a firm’s distinctive competence with available 
opportunities and thereby gain competitive advantage. 
The familiar SWOT framework – the analysis of a business’s strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities and threats – emerged from the work of these writers on business policy.  
     However after the early 1970s the thinking on distinctive competencies or corporate 
strengths stalled. The greatest reason was that managers had a hard time deciding what 
were the corporate strengths or weaknesses. 
Howard Stevenson6, in an empirical study on assessing corporate capabilities, found that 
there was often little consensus on a company’s strengths among its managers and that 
higher level managers tended to be more optimistic about their firm’s capabilities than 
lower level managers. 
     Charles Hofer and Dan Schendel, in their 1978 text Strategy Formulation : Analytical 
Concepts7 advocated the process of assessing corporate resources, strengths and weaknesses 
but noted that many strategy formulation models skipped this step. The reason, they 
explained, was because such an analysis can be fruitless in isolation. ‘Thus, one cannot tell 
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whether it is a strength or a weakness to be seven feet tall until one specifies what that tall 
individual is supposed to do.’ 
     Another reason that the thinking on competencies remained relatively dormant 
during the 1970s and early 1980s, was that influential academics and consultants turned 
their attention to other approaches to strategy. At the level of the business strategy, the 
environmental school exemplified by Michael Porter8 developed frameworks such as the 
five forces analysis, which helped managers understand external opportunities and 
competitive threats. In this approach, the strategist analyzes industry attractiveness and 
market opportunities and formulates a strategy based on these analyses. The next step is to 
determine if the business has the requisite skills to implement the chosen strategy, or if it 
can acquire those skills at a reasonable cost. At the corporate level, techniques of portfolio 
planning, developed by the Boston Consulting Group and others, helped corporate 
managers analyzes the often desparate businesses in terms of competitive position and 
industry attractiveness. 
Portfolio management offered guidance to corporate managers on building portfolios of 
businesses with complementary growth and cash generating characteristics. 
     These approaches to business level and corporate level strategy dominated 
management ideology through the 1980s, but the idea on a firm’s internal competencies 
was not entirely forgotten. The Japanese academic Hiroyuko Itami9, in his influential book 
Mobilizing Invisible Assets, also stresses the importance of building on a firm’s strengths, or 
what he calls its “invisible assets”. He defined invisible assets as properties of a company 
with the potential for producing profit that do not show up on a printed balance sheet such 
as reputation, brand-name, technical expertise and customer loyalty as compared to 
physical assets such as plant, real estate or manufactured stock. Itami argued that although 
invisible assets are often overlooked, they are the most enduring source of a company’s 
competitive advantage. In his review, a successful strategy rests on finding ways of fully 
exploiting such invisible assets in the marketplace. For these authors, the starting point of 
strategy was the analysis of the firm’s internal resources and capabilities. This gathered 
momentum with the emergence of the resource based school during the 1980s.   
     The resource based school focuses on the firm’s internal characteristics to explain 
why firms pursue different strategies with different outcomes. 
The central proposition of this group of writers is that the organization is an accretion of 
specialized resources which can be used to gain a privileged market position – in other 
words, sustainable competitive advantage. Firms acquire, develop and expand their 
resource bundles over time, and because organizations follow different developmental 
paths each firm has different resources. Thus, firms pursue different strategies in order to 
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exploit their specific resources. 
     These concepts are relevant to both business unit strategy and to corporate level 
strategy. At the business level, the key idea is that competitive advantage stems from a 
firm’s unique resources and capabilities which are hard for competitors to imitate or 
acquire. 
At the corporate level, resource based theorists perceive the firm as bundles of resources 
which can have different applications, which means the firm’s resources can be deployed in 
different businesses with different end products. A successful corporate strategy depends 
on accumulating specialized resources and exploiting them by matching these resources to 
market opportunities through the creation of business units. 
Resource-based thinkers regard internal attributes and capabilities as a more stable anchor 
for both business level and corporate level strategy than the varying demands of a volatile 
market place, and this is similar to earlier concept on a firm’s strengths and current work 
on competencies and capabilities.   
     The firm’s resources and capabilities are competitively important if they are 
(1)valuable, (2) rare and (3)difficult to imitate. First the value of a resource depends on the 
opportunities available for exploiting it, and these opportunities can change. For example, 
IBM’s capabilities in mainframe computers became less valuable as personal computers 
became more sophisticated and cheaper. Second competitively important resources are also 
rare. 
If many competitors have the same or similar capabilities, none of them will have a 
competitive advantage. 
The third criteria for competitively important resources is that they are difficult to imitate. 
Many physical resources are easily imitated; rivals can build similar plants or copy a 
process technology.  
     It is far more difficult to imitate capabilities which depend on teamwork, culture and 
organizational routines. These resources are usually complex, the result of firm’s own 
history and of numerous small decisions over time which contribute to the development of 
unique capabilities. Barney cites the example of Hewlett Packard’s corporate culture, 
which encourages teamwork and co-operation across divisions. 
This has enabled HP to use its technologies in varied products-printers, plotters, computers 
and electronic instruments – and to make these products compatible. Rival firms may be 
able to duplicate the technology of HP’s products, but it is not easy for competitors to 
imitate the culture and organization which HP’s success. 
     Capabilities are often a firm’s most important resources because they are valuable, 
rare and difficult to imitate. At the same time, the complexity and opaqueness of a firm’s 
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capabilities creates a management problem of its own. To capitalize on an organization’s 
resources, managers need to be able to identify them, make decisions about how to exploit 
them, and know how to expand them. Without this knowledge, successful strategies would 
only be the lucky result of historical decisions or accidents. 
The authors of the process of organizational learning are Edwin Nevis and Janet Gould of 
the Organizational Learning Center at MIT Sloan School of Management and Anthony 
DiBella. In their article, ‘Understanding Organizations as Learning Systems’, the authors 
define organizational learning as ‘the capacity or processes within an organization to 
maintain or improve performance based on experience’. The authors argue that improving 
a firm’s learning processes can enhance its performance. 
     Nevis, Gould and DiBella10 identify three stages in the learning process: knowledge 
acquisition, knowledge sharing and knowledge utilization, but they caution that learning is 
not necessarily linear through these stages. Their research, at companies such as Motorola, 
Electricite de France and Fiat, reveled that firm learn in different ways. For example, some 
firms develop knowledge internally while others more readily accept knowledge developed 
externally. Knowledge dissemination is highly formal in some companies, but in other 
companies it occurs informally, through networking or casual interactions. Companies also 
differ in the areas in which they invest in learning: an engineering company is likely to 
focus on production or process improvement while a consumer goods company may devote 
more time and effort to better delivery or service systems. The authors suggest that there is 
no single type of a successful ‘learning organization’; instead, there are many different 
learning systems, each of which can be effective. The authors also identify facilitating 
factors, or approaches which can enhance learning in all organizations. A concern with 
measurement, a climate of openness, champions and involved leadership are among the 
factors which contribute to an organization’s learning system. 
     Nevis and his co-authors also suggest strategies for improving learning in an 
organization.  One option is to make the existing learning system more effective by 
strengthening or modifying the firm’s learning orientations. For example, a firm that 
traditionally invests heavily in production improvements may improve service by putting 
more resources into the education and training of sales personnel. Another option is to 
improve facilitating factors, such as developing measurement systems or encouraging more 
communication across units. A third option is to try and change both learning orientations 
and facilitating factors. This is most difficult option, amounting to transformational change. 
Nevis, Gould and DiBella urge managers to evaluate their firm’s current learning system, 
and its facilitating factors, to understand its strengths and weaknesses. This will help 
managers select appropriate strategies for improving or changing the ways in which the 
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firm acquires, shares and utilizes knowledge. 
     Yves Doz,11draws on many of the concepts developed by the resource based school 
and in the literature on learning organizations to discuss the management of core 
competencies. Doz, writes that his work is a modest attempt to move in the direction of a 
managerial theory of core competencies’. His aim is to identify the major dilemmas 
managers confront in trying to manage core competencies, and to suggest some approaches 
which can help solve these dilemmas. 
     Doz begins by discussing how difficult it is to manage competencies. In the first 
place, competencies are complex organizational routines and therefore difficult to define or 
to understand fully. They develop in different ways, even in a single organization, and the 
developmental path is often unclear. The learning which competencies is often tacit and 
therefore difficult to communicate and share. Doz aims to make sense of the ‘messiness’ of 
competencies by identifying five key processes in competence management, they are  
development, diffusion, integration, leverage and renewal of competencies. Each process 
may follow a natural track, but managers can also intervene to manage it more efficiently. 
For example, every firm must have some competencies if it is to survive. These usually 
develop through ‘learning by doing’, which demands no specific intervention from 
managers. At certain times though, managers may need to accelerate the development of 
competencies. The firm may face competitive threats from new rivals, or it may be in a 
position where its existing competencies are becoming less valuable. 
     Doz examines the managerial tools available to accelerate the development of 
competencies. These include business process reengineering, quality management, 
professional training. Yet, the use of such tools also involves risks. Organizational focus on 
improving or gaining a specific competence may challenge existing power structures, or 
undermine naturally emerging competencies. Managers may mis- identify the competencies 
which should be encouraged. Similar dilemmas arise with each of the key processes of 
competence management. Should managers leave the diffusion of competencies to the 
informal network of the organization, or should they try to improve diffusion through best 
practice exchange or by managing the internal labor market? Is it likely that the 
organization will fully exploit its competencies, or should managers deliberately explore 
new ways of leveraging its competencies?  
 
2-2.  Understanding Competitive Advantage 
     Strategic managers and researchers have long been interested in understanding 
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sources of competitive advantage for firms. Traditionally, this effort has focused on the 
relationship between a firm’s environmental opportunities and threats on one hand, and its 
internal strengths and weaknesses on the other. Summarized in what has come to be known 
as the SWOT(Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats) analysis, this traditional 
logic suggests that firms that use their internal strengths in exploiting environmental 
opportunities and neutralizing environmental threats, while avoiding internal weaknesses, 
are more likely to gain competitive advantages than other kinds of firms10. 
     This simple SWOT framework points to the importance of both external and internal 
phenomena in understanding the sources of competitive advantage. To this date, the 
development of tools for analyzing environmental opportunities and threats has proceeded 
much more rapidly than the development of tools for analyzing a firm’s internal strengths 
and weaknesses. 
     The history of strategic management research can be understood as an attempt to ‘fill 
in the blanks’ created by the SWOT framework; i.e., to move beyond suggesting that 
strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats are important for understanding 
competitive advantage to suggest models and frameworks that can be used to analyze and 
evaluate opportunities and threats.8  Porter’s work on the ‘five forces model’, the 
relationship between industry structure and strategic opportunities, and strategic groups can 
all be understood as an effort to unpack the concepts of environmental opportunities and 
threats in a theoretically rigorous, yet highly applicable way.  
     However, the SWOT framework tells us that an environmental analysis no - matter 
how rigorous - is only half the story. A complete understanding of sources of competitive 
advantage requires the analysis of a firm’s internal strengths and weaknesses well.12 The 
importance of integrating internal analyzes with environmental analyses can be seen when 
evaluating the sources of competitive advantage of many firms. Consider, for example,  
l WalMart, a firm that has consistently earned a return on sales double the average of its 
industry for the last twenty years 
l Southwest airlines, a firm whose profits continued to increase, despite losses at other 
U.S. airlines that totaled profit almost $10 billion from 1990 to 1993; and  
l Nucor Steel, a firm whose stock price continued to soar through the 1980s and ‘90s, 
despite the fact that the market value of most steel companies has remained flat or 
fallen during the same time period.13 
     These firms, and many others, have all gained competitive advantages-despite the 
unattractive, high threat, low opportunity environments in which they operate. Even the 
most careful and complete analysis of these firms’ competitive environments cannot 
explain their success. Such explanations must also include these firms’ internal attributes, 
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their strengths and weaknesses, as sources of competitive advantage.  
     A firm’s resources and capabilities include all of the financial, physical, human, and 
organizational assets used by a firm to develop, manufacture, and deliver products or 
services to its customers. Financial resources include debt, equity, retained earnings, and so 
forth, physical resources include the machines, manufacturing facilities, and buildings 
firms use in their operations. Human resources include all the experience, knowledge, 
judgment, risk taking propensity, and wisdom of individuals associated with a firm. 
Organizational resources include the history, relationships, trust, and organizational culture 
that are attributes of groups of individuals associated with a firm., along with a firm’s 
formal reporting structure, explicit management control systems, and compensation 
policies. In the process of filling in the ‘internal blanks’ created by SWOT analysis, 
managers must address four important questions about their resources and 
capabilities:(1)the question of value, (2) the question of rareness,(3) the question of 
imitability, and (4) the question of organization. 
 
2-2-1. The Characteristic of Value 
     To begin evaluating the competitive implications of a firm’s resources and 
capabilities, managers must first answer the question of value : Do a firm’s resources and 
capabilities add va lue by enabling it to exploit opportunities and/or neutralize threats? 
     The answer to this question, for some firms, has been yes. Sony, for example, has a 
great deal of experience in designing, manufacturing, and selling miniaturized electronic 
technology. Sony has used these resources to exploit numerous market opportunities, 
including portable tape players, portable disc players, portable televisions, easy-to-hold 
8mm video cameras and mini disc player. 3M has used its skills and experience in 
substrates, coatings, and adhesives, along with an organizational culture that rewards risk 
taking and creativity to exploit numerous market opportunities in office products, including 
invisible tape and Post-ItTM  Notes. Sony’s and 3M’s resources – including their specific 
technological skills and creative organizational cultures –made it possible for these firms to 
respond to and even create new environmental opportunities.14 
     Unfortunately, for other firms, the answer to the question of value has been no. For 
example, USX’s long experience in traditional steel market made it almost impossible for 
USX to recognize and respond to fundamental changes in the structure of the steel industry.  
Because they could not recognize new opportunities and threats, USX delayed its 
investment in, among other opportunities, thin slab continuous casting steel manufacturing 
technology. Nucor Steel, on the other hand, was not shackled by its experience, made these 
investments early, and has become a major player in the international steel industry. In a 
 13 
similar way, Sears was unable to recognize or respond to changes in the retail market that 
had been created by WalMart and specialty retail stores. In a sense, Sears’ historical 
success, along with a commitment to stick with the traditional way of doing things, led the 
company to miss some significant market opportunities.15   
     Although a firm’s resources and capabilities may have added value in the past, 
changes in the consumers taste, industry structure, or technology can render them less 
valuable in the future. General Electric’s capabilities in transistor manufacturing became 
much less valuable when semi-conductors were invented. American Airlines’ skills in 
managing their relationship with the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) became much less 
valuable after airline deregulation. IBM’s numerous capabilities in the mainframe 
computing business became less valuable with the power increases and price reduction of 
personal and mini computers. Therefore one of the most important responsibilities of 
strategic managers is to constantly evaluate whether or not their firm’s resources and 
capabilities continue to add value despite changes in the competitive environment. 
     Some environmental changes are so drastic that few, if any, of a firm’s resources 
remain valuable in any environmental context.15 However, this kind of radical 
environmental change is unusual. More commonly, changes in a firm’s environment may 
reduce the value of a firm’s resources in their current use, while leaving the value of those 
resources in other uses unchanged. Such changes might even increase the value of those 
resources in those other uses. In this situation, the critical issue facing managers is : how 
can we use our traditional strengths in new ways to explo it opportunities and/or neutralize 
threats? 
     Numerous firms have weathered these environmental shifts by finding new ways to 
apply their traditional strengths. AT&T had developed a reputation for providing high-
quality long distance telephone service.   
It moved rapidly to exploit this reputation in the newly competitive long distance market 
by aggressively marketing its services against MCI, Sprint, and other carriers.  Also, 
AT&T had traditional strengths in research and development with its Bell Labs subsidiary.  
To exploit these strengths in its new competitive context, AT&T shifted Bell Labs’ mission 
from basic research to applied research, and then leveraged those skills by forming 
numerous joint ventures, acquiring NCR, and other actions. Through this process, AT&T 
has been able to use some of it historically important capabilities to try to position itself as 
a major actor in the global telecommunications and computing industry.  
     Another firm that has gone through a similar transformation is the Hunter Fan 
company.  Formed in 1886, Hunter Fan developed the technology it needed to be the 
market share leader in ceiling fans used to cool large manufacturing facilities.  
 14 
Unfortunately, the invention of air conditioning significantly reduced demand for industrial 
fans, and Hunter Fan’s performance deteriorated rapidly.  However, in the 1970s, rising 
energy prices made energy conservation more important to home owners.  Since ceiling 
fans can significantly reduce home energy consumption, Hunter Fan was able to move 
quickly to exploit this new opportunity.  Of course, Hunter Fan had to develop some new 
skills as well, including brass-plating capabilities and new distribution networks.  
However, by building on its traditional strengths in new ways, Hunter fan has become a 
leader in the home ceiling fan market.16 
     By answering the question of value, managers link the analysis of internal resources 
and capabilities with the analysis of environmental opportunities and threats. The models 
developed by Porter and his associates can be used to isolate potential opportunities and 
threats that the resources a firm controls can exploit or neutralize.0 
     Of course, the resources and capabilities of different firms can be valuable in 
different ways.  This can be true, even if firms are competing in the same industry.  For 
example , while both Rolex and Timex manufacture watches, they exploit very different 
valuable resources.  Rolex emphasizes its quality manufacturing, commitment to 
excellence, and high-status reputation in marketing its watches.  Timex emphasize its 
high-volume, low-cost manufacturing skills and abilities.  Rolex exploits its capabilities 
in responding to demand for very expensive watches;  Timex exploits it resources in 
responding to demand for practical, reliable, low-cost timekeeping. 
 
2-2-2. The Characteristic of Rareness   
     A firm’s resources and capabilities are valuable is that an important first 
consideration in understanding internal sources of competitive advantage. However, if a 
particular resource and capability is controlled by numerous competing firms, then that 
resource is unlikely to be a source of competitive advantage for any one of them.  Instead, 
valuable but common(i.e. not rare) resources and capabilities are sources of competitive 
parity.  For managers evaluating the competitive implications of their resources and 
capabilities, these observations lead to the second critical issue: how many competing 
firms already possess these valuable resources and capabilities? 
     For example, consider, two firms competing in the global communications and 
computing industries: NEC and AT&T. Both these firms are developing many of the same 
capabilities that are likely to be needed in these industries over the next decade.      
These capabilities are clearly valuable, however since at least these two firms, and maybe 
others, are developing them. If they are not rare, they cannot be sources of competitive 
advantage for either NEC or AT&T. If either of these firms are to gain competitive  
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advantages, they must exploit resources and capabilities that are both cited as developing .  
This may be part of the reason why AT&T recently restructured its telecommunications 
and computer businesses into separate firms. 
     While resources and capabilities must be rare among competing firms in order to be 
a source of competitive advantage, this does not mean that common, but valuable, 
resources are not important. Indeed, such resources and capabilities may be essential for a 
firm’s survival. On the other hand, if a firm’s resources are valuable and rare, those 
resources may enable a firm to gain at least a temporary competitive advantage. WalMart’s 
skills in developing and using point-of-purchase data collection to control inventory have 
given it a competitive advantage over K-Mart, a firm that until recently has not had access 
to this timely information. Thus, for many years, WalMart’s valuable point-of-purchase 
inventory control systems were rare, at least relative to its major U.S. competitor, K-Mart. 
 
2-2-3. The Characteristic of Imitability 
     A firm that possesses valuable and rare resources and capabilities can gain, at least, a 
temporary competitive advantage. In addition, if competing firms face a cost disadvantage 
in imitating these resources and capabilities, firms with these special abilities can obtain a 
sustained competitive advantage. These observations lead to the question of imitability : do 
firms without a resource or capability face a cost disadvantage in obtaining it compared to 
firms that already possess it ? 
     Obviously, imitation is critical to understanding the ability of resources and 
capabilities to generate sustained competitive advantages. Imitation can occur in at least 
two ways: duplication and substitution. Duplication occurs when an imitating firm builds 
the same kinds of resources as the firm it is imitating. If one firm has a competitive 
advantage because of its research and development skills, then a duplicating firm will try to 
imitate that resource by developing its own research and development skills. In addition, 
firms may be able to substitute some resources for other resources. If these substitute 
resources have the same strategic implications and are no more costly to develop, then 
imitation through substitution will lead to competitive parity in the long run. 
 
2-2-4. The Characteristic of Organization 
     A firm’s competitive advantage potential depends on the value, rareness, and 
imitability of its resources and capabilities.  However, to fully realize this potential, a firm 
must also be organized to exploit its resources and capabilities. Numerous components of a 
firm’s organization are relevant when answering the question of organization, including its 
formal reporting structure, its explicit management control systems, and its compensation 
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policies.  These components are referred to as complementary resources because they 
have limited abilities to generate a competitive advantages in isolation. However, in 
combination with other resources and capabilities, they can enable a firm to realize its full 
competitive advantage.17 
     Much of Caterpillar’s sustained competitive advantage in the heavy construction 
industry can be traced to its history. It become the sole supplier of this equipment to allied 
forces in the Second World War.  However, if Caterpillar’s management had not taken 
advantage of this opportunity by implementing a global formal reporting structure, global 
inventory and other control systems, and compensation policies that created incentives for 
its employees to work around the world, then Caterpillar’s potential for competitive 
advantage; i.e. adopting a global organizational form was only relevant for Caterpillar 
because it was pursuing a global opportunity. However, this organization was essential for 
Caterpillar to realize its full competitive advantage potential. 
     In a similar way, much of WalMart’s continuing competitive advantage in the 
discount retailing industry can be attributed to its early entry into rural markets in the 
southern United States.  To fully exploit this geographic advantage, WalMart needed to 
implemented appropriate reporting structures, control systems, and compensation policies.  
We have already seen that one of these components of WalMart’s organization - its point-of-
purchase inventory control system – is being imitated by K-Mart, so in and of itself, it will 
not likely to be a source of sustained competitive advantage.  However, this inventory 
control system has enabled WalMart to take full advantage of its rural locations by 
decreasing the probability of stock outs and by reducing inventory costs. 
     While a complementary organization enabled Caterpillar and WalMart to realize 
their full competitive advantage, Xerox was prevented from taking full advantage of some 
of its most critical valuable, rare, and costly-to- imitate resources and capabilities because it 
lacked such organization skills.  Through the 1960s and early 1970s, Xerox invested in a 
series of very innovative technology development research efforts.  Xerox managed this 
research effort by creating a stand alone research laboratory (Xerox PARC, in Palo Alto, 
California), and by assembling a large group of highly creative and innovative scientists 
and engineers to work there.  Left to their own devices, these scientists and engineers 
developed an amazing array of technological innovations, including the personal computer, 
the ‘mouse’, windows-type software, the laser printer, the ‘paperless office’, ethernet, and 
so forth.  In retrospect, the market potential of these technologies was enormous.  
Moreover, since these technologies were developed at Xerox PARC, they were rare. Finally, 
Xerox may have been able to gain some important first mover advantages if they had been 
able to translate these technologies into products, thereby increasing the cost to other firms 
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of imitating these technologies. 
     Unfortunately, Xerox did not have an organization in place to take advantage of these 
resources. For example, no structure existed whereby Xerox PARC’s innovations could 
become known to managers at Xerox.  Indeed, most Xerox managers – even many senior 
managers – were unaware of these technological developments through the mid-1970s.        
     Once they finally became aware of them, very few of the innovations survived 
Xerox’s highly bureaucratic product development process – a process where product 
development projects were divided into hundreds of minute tasks, and progress in each task 
was reviewed by dozens of large committees.  Even those innovations that survived the 
product development process were not exploited by Xerox managers.  Management 
compensation at Xerox depended almost exclusively on maximizing current revenue.  
Short-term profitability was relatively less important in compensation calculations, and the 
development of markets for future sales and profitability was essentially irrelevant.  
Xerox’s formal reporting structure, its explicit management control systems, and its 
compensation policies were all inconsistent with exploiting the valuable, rare, and costly-
to-imitate resources developed at Xerox PARC.  Not surprisingly, Xerox failed to exploit 
any of these potential sources of sustained competitive advantage.18 
 
 
2-3. Core Competence Management 
2-3-1. Core Competence Management 
     Core competence implies the aggregate capabilities, technologies and /or knowledge 
of a company, which are unique to it and are acknowledged to its members.  The core 
competence has led the company to where it is and will lead it in the future with an 
adequate modification or with an addition of another core competence.  
     Companies have been so far evaluated only with the tangible measurements such as 
their scales, manufacturing equipment, financing capabilities, etc.  We have, however, 
neglected the other factors like the company image, the accumulated technology, the 
information for consumer, the creativity of employees, the sense of challenge, the influence 
on distribution, the favorable relationship with suppliers, the corporate culture of challenge, 
the influence on distribution, the favorable relationship with suppliers, the corporate 
culture of challenge and creativity, the efficient management system, etc., all of companies.  
     Core competence management involves the activities such as 1) finding out the core 
competence of a company 2)further developing it 3)creating new core competence with an 
addition of new technology, product, service and so on to the existing core competence and 
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4) diversifying itself to new and promising business domain. 
 
 
2-3-2. The Method of Core Competence Management 
 The process of core competence management is listed below.  
1) The mind-transformation activities (the mind of the company members) should be 
preceded with forming the agreement of the company members on why they have to 
compete based upon the core competence. 
2) The vision of the company should be clearly presented to its members. 
3) What should be needed for the improvement of the company after the most comparative 
competitiveness of the company should be analyzed.  (A bench-marking to the 
advanced companies is needed.) 
4) The needs of the future should be grasped with understanding the trend of the industry.  
The trend involves the transformation of competitors, the change of customer needs, the 
technology changes, etc, which are very crucial factors for the precise forecast of the 
industry.  
5) A study should be done on the method of developing the existing core competence, and 
furthermore creating new core competence with some technology, service, and/or 
product connected with it. 
6) Restructuring of the company’s business should be decided upon as well as a 
diversifying the growing industry.  
7) Finally, the company members should be educated on the new core competence, so that 
the organization may be vigorously activated. 
 
2-2-3. Some Crit ical Factors for Core Competence Management 
1) Either the core competence should be decided based upon the strategy, or the strategy 
should be formulated based upon the core competence.  Therefore, a company should 
clarify the relationship between the strategy and core competence. 
For example, once Domino Pizza formulated the strategy that it would deliver its pizza 
within 30 minutes upon a request, it should have or develop the relevant core 
competence on the production technology of fast cooking or the order taking and the 
delivery.  
2) The company should clearly define its core competence which is distinguished from  
other and form the agreement of its members.  It is not possible to manage its core 
competence unless the company knows.  Often are the cases that a series of some 
technologies and capabilities are selected being as core competence, which shows that 
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many a people wants their work to be treated as core work , but not to be so.  In other 
words, it is requested that the core competence be distinguished from its products and 
services, and also from the capabilities around it. 
The company should have all its members in terms of business field, function, 
geography, hierarchy, etc. participating in drawing and defining its core competence. 
3) It is crucial to create the right core competence.  The core competence of a company 
should be distinguished from its capital, infrastructure, competitive advantage, critical 
success factor, etc.  For instances, such capabilities can be classified as the core 
competence as Toyota’s optimal factory management, Walmart’s distribution 
management, and Sony’s miniaturization.  
It is also important to understand that a core competence can not last for good. The core  
competence of Domino pizza fast delivering capability- used to be its unique and  
successful, but became the basic capability which all the pizza companies are required to  
have.  Therefore, a company should check whether or not its core competence might  
change to the basic competence which all competing companies own. 
4) Core competence should be studied through bench-marking to the competing companies 
and be continuously developed to be accumulated. A company should not only analyze 
itself but also its competitors.  It is impossible to get a competitive advantage if a 
company judges its technology and service to be excellent, yet does not surpass its 
competitor. Even though a company has some competence that is not so satisfactory, it 
should closely understand and continuously develop and accumulate competence when 
it is the best among others or superior to that of its competitor. 
5) A company should keep its core competence to itself. Transferring information to its 
competitors may lead to their successful development of the core competence. 
6) A company should avoid centering upon the business division.  The companies with 
several business divisions or the groups with many subsidiary companies are usually 
setting goals and formulating strategies independently.  This causes a company to 
compete among business units and each bus iness unit to focus on its partial optimization, 
which erodes on the total optimum of the company which gives negative effects on it, 
failing to have any synergy effect. 
7) It is desirable to use strategic alliance or M&A as ways to secure core competence. 
8) The recent revolutionary adopt trend requires the companies to have new core 
competence and to be compelled to connect it to the exiting core competence, so that 
they should need the capability of organization learning.  The company should analyze 
the environment internally and externally to decide which capabilities and technologies 
are needed in order to compete with its competitors with a new core competence, and 
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should educate its members to the goal. 
 
2-4.  The Application of Core Competence 
Core competence performs different roles in each organization according to company’s 
individual situation and need.  The applied field of core competence approach is listed 
below. 
     First, it works as the guidance for diversification.  According to the strategic report 
of AT&T, while the company enters into a new market, core competence enables the 
company to concentrate on the existing business.  Cargill produces steel vessels as well as 
fertilizer, flour, and corn syrup.  The company not only sells cooked meat to buyers but 
also imports shrimp.  It also provides financial service, and trade & intermediate service.  
All these businesses listed above seem to be the collection of unrelated activities, but in 
fact, a few basic techniques –treatment of large volume product-interlink all businesses.  
Cargill takes a very cautious approach when it takes over other companies or enters into 
new fields.  It enters into a field, only when such field has been previously experienced, 
and in this case, it attempts expansion only when entering into such field can increase the 
prominent aspect of the existing business.  
     Second, it leads the activation of the organization. By linking traditional business to 
products and service of the future, the company acquires greater opportunity for success. 
Corning Co., Ltd. can be a good example, since it applied traditional core competence to 
new high-growth field.  Corning went back to the past from 1983 to 1989, and underwent 
a process to fundamentally look back upon how the company used to be.  James Riesbeck, 
Vice Chairman, who is in charge of the business development, threw several questions. 
“What are we good at?”,  “What is the field that was important for us historically, but at 
present attained maturity, and that can’t be included I the up-and-coming business of the 
1980’s and the 1990’s ?” 
     While Corning disposed several business divisions in the 1980’s which had 
$0.5billion amount of sales, including Corning’s oldest business field such as the light bulb 
business and the laboratory of glass products in Europe, it invested $0.4billion to enter into 
high-growth fields such as the research and service business.  Out of the experimental 
ideas they fostered, Corning selected the field that had the greatest potential to lead the 
future’s market.  As a result, even though the company’s competence hadn’t changed, 
Corning’s up-and-coming business of the early 1990’s had changed drastically from that of 
1980’s. 
     Third, it accelerates company’s globalization.  Colgate – Palmolive, made of 62 
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subsidiaries and 42 product lines, reorganized the company centering around 5 core global 
businesses and 5 areas.  This company united diversified business utilizing the concept of 
core competence. Geoff Dance, Vice President of the Strategy Planning Division said, “We 
found out that the element our subsidiaries had in common was core competence.” 
     By emphasizing the core competence subsidiaries held in common, Colgate strived 
to break down the cultural barrier of the company, the unlimited right of self- regulation that 
executives of the subsidiaries exercised. By calling a meeting with global staffs in each 
core business division in the first place, the company assembled many people of various 
abilities such as the manager, the research & development staff, the producing employee, 
the market research specialist, and the marketing & business law expert, and set up the 
short and long term goal for each of the core business.  By examining the organization in 
the perspective of each business division’s core competence, the company was able to 
establish a new strategic direction. This company made the best use of it’s ability in brand 
management & division of specialists.  
    Fourth, it maintains the competitiveness of the company. Comprehending one’s own 
core competence, the company can prevent failures when investment withdrawing from 
already matured industry to all appearances. The good example can be America’s TV 
manufacturing companies. They lost the VCR market by disposing the VCR business 
division. 
   Garry Hamel, the professor of London Business Management Graduate School, said 
“you must realize the fact that giving up certain businesses or products is the same as 
giving up the market where you can use your potential capability.  By getting a supply of 
important part of product from outside, the company can be worn out of it’s core 
competence gradually without any realization. Such parts are called, ‘core product’ since 
these have a direct influence toward final product’s value and effect. 
     Professor Hamel said that the standard practice of getting supply of core parts from 
outside was a “dangerous tendency”.  Even if there is no necessity for companies to 
perform complete vertical integration, important core parts should be manufactured within 
the company in order to maintain the competitiveness continuously in one’s own business 
field as a leading company.  
     Fifth, it makes the company to concentrate on the research & development endeavor.  
NEC of Japan reinvestigates company’s fundamental technique & core technique every 
five years, and checks if it’s R&D effort is heading for the right direction.  15 years ago, 
NEC discovered approximately 20 core techniques, and now retains 36 core techniques in 
total.  NEC asserts that they use 18% of it’s earnings to R&D.  Other companies which 
hold a leading position in this industry is known to spend far less amount of money in 
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R&D than NEC.  Even though some companies didn’ t pour in a great amount of resource 
in R&D, they said they obtained a very complacent result by concentrating on their R & D 
investment in a particular field.  In order to maximize the effect of R & D investment, 
many pharmaceutical companies concentrate their resources on diseases and 
pharmaceutical fields where they are convinced of their distinguished ability.  
     Sixth, it allows the company to select strategic alliance.  It has become a trite fact 
that strategic alliance must be implanted for the company to grow and develop 
continuously in the future.  When Polaroid applied immediate image developing 
technique to the new market,  Polaroid didn’t make an attempt to manufacture all the 
facilities and products internally essential to it.  Instead, Polaroid circumspectly selected a 
partner based on the analysis of the company’s core competence.  When the company 
wanted to set a foot in the medical technique field with the core competence which the 
company had possessed, Polaroid made every effort to find a suitable partner who 
possessed the company’s lacking special technique of medical technique field. 
     Seventh, it leads to a consensus of the goal of strategic business division and that of 
the whole company.  The common defect which the strategic business unit organization 
has is the tendency to sacrifice the organization’s goal on the interest of their division 
where the members of the business division and executives take their positions.  This 
tendency especially appears when people are insecure about their employment.  By 
reinforcing the perception of core competence, AT & T confronted with the closed-
mindedness of the strategic business organization. 
    AT & T discovered 5 core fields where it could utilize all the resources surpassing 
the level of strategic business unit.  These were visual communication, wireless 
communication, data networking, manufacturing industry, network construction, and so on.  
As the result, the consideration of core competence contributed enormously to the 
appearance of the video phone which came under the first product out of the TV phone 
products and service expected to come out in the future in early 1992. 
With the help of Bell Lab’s, the subsidiary of AT&T, well-known R&D, AT&T possessed a 
core competence in various fields.  Therefore, their urgent challenge was not how they 
could develop the core techniques, but how they could accelerate the development of 
products and service by using the core competence. 
 
 
Ⅲ.  A Case Study Based on Core Competence  
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     The success of the company depends on the ability to grasp the core competence and 
develop it continuously. One can study on the core competence through the example of 
Canon Co. Ltd.   
     Canon, the worldwide camera and copier company, introduced two revolutionary 
new products in 1982, the PC-10 and the PC-20 maintenance free personal copiers.  
Designed to be smaller, simpler, less expensive, and more reliable than the nearest 
competitor, they were the world’s first truly ‘personal’ copiers.  They were designed for 
use in small offices or at home by professionals and self-employed individuals.  The PC 
copiers were rapidly accepted by these potential buyers, resulting in a major success for 
Canon.19 
     Through the success of the PC copiers, Canon achieved market performance, market 
expansion, technological benefits, and organizational renewal.  Within a few months of 
their market introduction, sales had reached a point at which Canon’s manufacturing 
facilities were operating near capacity.  By the end of 1987, the PC copiers had become 
the most sold copiers in the world.  They served the needs of a previously ignored market 
segment (small offices and home offices), one that Canon has since dominated. 
     Overall, Canon’s market share in plain paper copiers increased dramatically, almost 
doubling in the United States from 1982 to 1991.  The development of the PC copiers also 
enabled Canon to acquire major technological know-how and patent rights.  The company 
leveraged this technology through many new and successful products, including the laser 
and bubble-jet copies.  Consequently, Canon’s worldwide sales of business equipment 
more than tripled from 1982 to 1991, and during that time Canon became the world’s 
largest copier company in units sold.  This success was not only financially rewarding, 
but also energized the Canon organization.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3-1.  The Canon Organization 
     Canon started in Japan in 1937 as a small camera manufacturing company.  It grew 
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rapidly after World War Ⅱ.  Although it was the world’s largest camera company in 1982, 
less than half of its revenue came from cameras and more than a quarter of its revenues 
came from large copiers.  Canon had diversified into many areas in the 1950s and 1960s, 
including office micro graphic equipment in 1959, copiers in 1962, and electronic 
calculators in 1964.  It had also expanded globally during that period, with Japan, the 
United States, and Europe each accounting for roughly one third of its business. 
    Canon’s main business strengths were its commitment to technology and an 
aggressive, entrepreneurial, and risk-taking corporate culture.  In every sense, R&D drives 
Canon’s strategic direction and business, but success could not be achieved without its 
flexible organizational structure that allows for collaboration, creativity, and synergy 
between different functional and business areas.  Over the years, this structure has 
resulted in numerous R&D accomplishments.  For example, among other feats, Canon 
introduced its New Process (NP) copier technology in 1968, the first acceptable alternative 
to the xerographic process.  It also developed the world’s first electronic camera, the 
Canon AE-1.  Both of these developments became major commercial successes.  
     Since the 1960s, Canon has also been one of the world’s leading companies in patent 
ownership.  For example, Canon acquired more than 500 patents each for the NP and the 
AE-1 electronic camera technologies.  These patents enabled the company to preempt its 
competitors by establishing strong entry barriers, earn revenues by licensing technology, 
and build a reputation in the market as an innovator. 
     Canon’s entrepreneurial culture facilitated a steady stream of new ideas, product 
development, entry into foreign markets, and bold strategic alliances with competitor (such 
as the one in which Canon licensed its technology to, and manufactured products for, 
Eastman Kodak).  Canon’s corporate culture deviated form the traditional Japanese 
management style.  Canon openly recruited engineers from other Japanese companies, 
and often paid its employees not simply on seniority but also on performance.  Its 
corporate philosophy showed tremendous respect for the individual to stimulate and reward 
the energy and creativity necessary for innovation.  
     Canon’s main weaknesses were poor marketing and inadequate protection of its 
technology, which resulted in market failures and missed opportunities.  For example, its 
pocket calculator failed because of late entry in an already saturated market.  Its NP series 
of copies took a long time to become successful because the company was slow to convey 
the real benefits of the technology to users.  Also, Canon may have licensed too soon its 
“liquid dry” system of copier technology to more than 20 competitors, thereby forfeiting 
the financial benefits of a proprietary sales position. 
     On balance, if Canon could develop technology that squarely met and satisfied a 
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market need, it would have tremendous potential for success, especially if it could better 
manage its marketing capabilities.  It had achieved success with the marketing program 
for its innovative electronic camera (the AE-1), but the copier division had not had a major 
marketing success despite significant technology breakthroughs 
 
 
3-2.  Copier Market Background 
     Prior to the introduction of the Canon PC copiers in 1982, the world copier industry 
was characterized by rapid market growth, major advances in technology, and increasing 
competition.  The direction of the technology and the market favored plain paper copiers 
over coated paper copiers.  In 1981, revenue in the world copiers industry was more than 
three times greater and unit sales were almost five times greater than the 1976 levels.  
This growth had occurred uniformly across the United States, Europe, and Japan.  By 
1981, the copier industry had worldwide revenues of about $19.5 billion, with about 
45percent in the U.S., 30 percent in Europe, and the remainder split about evenly between 
Japan and the rest of the world.   
     Before PC copiers became available in 1982, copying was done on a departmental 
basis within companies and through commercial copy centers. Copy centers served a range 
of copying needs, from small copying jobs to large, high speed/high volume projects 
involving document preparation.  Satisfaction of copying needs depended on a copier’s 
price, quality, performance, features, maintenance, and after-sales support.  Those factors 
became the bases for defining various market segments.   
     For example, one part of the market could characterized by low usage (no more than 
5,000 copies per month), a need for clear copies and simple features such as enlargement 
and reduction, moderate price sensitivity, and minimal need for after-sales support from the 
vendor.  Another segment of the market might be characterized by high usage (more than 
25,000 copies a month), a need for high resolution copies and complete document 
preparation, high price sensitivity, use of numerous copying features, and an extensive 
vendor maintenance requirement. 
     Most copier companies sought to meet the market needs of the segments that had 
large usage requirements.  Because of its patented process, Xerox was the world market 
leader in satisfying the needs of high volume users.  However, many Japanese firms such 
as Canon, Ricoh, Toshiba, and Minolta successfully developed alternate technologies, 
initially to serve the Japanese market, but subsequently to penetrate the U.S. market with 
high quality products at competitive prices. 
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     As competition for the large users increased, growth opportunities became available 
in other market segments with different needs.  For example, convenience copying at 
commercial centers increased more rapidly than the entire world copier market.  Although 
these centers themselves presented opportunities for sales of large and midsize copiers, the 
needs of their users, usually small offices and home offices, represented a hidden market 
opportunity.  
     For small offices and the growing number of home offices, taking a large job to the 
local copy center was reasonable, but going to the copy center to make just a few copies 
was a nuisance.  High value would be placed on a relatively inexpensive copy machine 
that could make satisfactory individual copies and perform routine copying projects.  
Larger copying projects could still be taken to local copy centers.  The opportunity for an 
easy-to-use, durable, low priced, and maintenance-free small copier awaited innovation.  
Canon was one of several competitors that recognized this opportunity, and all were racing 
to build the best machine possible and be the first to market. 
 
 
3-3.  The Canon PC Copier Development Process 
     Because of the strong support of new ideas in the Canon organization, the idea and 
vision for a personal copier developed readily.  Such a copier had been discussed a few 
years previously and not regarded as feasible, but senior managers at Canon seized upon 
the idea during the late 1970s.  However, the barriers to success were high.  At the time 
the lowest copier prices were more than $2,000, and the machines required substantial 
maintenance.  Nevertheless, spurred on by the success of the AE-1 camera, top managers 
were keen to develop a similarly unique product for the copier market. 
     Canon conducted market surveys in both Japan and the United States to understand 
the nature of the copier market and to confirm that the small office / home office market 
segment was an attractive one.  The company also solicited informal feedback from its 
salesforce.  Both the formal and informal studies indicated a growing opportunity in the 
market segment consisting of small offices with fewer than five employees and home 
offices of self- employed professionals. 
     By the end of 1979, Hiroshi Tanaka, the director of the copier division, received the 
go–ahead from top managers to develop a new line of copiers to meet the needs of the 
targeted segment.  A staged new product development process ensued, which involved 
concept development , engineering feasibility studies, prototyping, engineering model 
development, and trial mass production. 
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 A small team was formed and the core concept was developed around several clearly 
defined key benefits: 
 
l Being the world’s lightest and most compact copier(under 45 pounds) 
l A price of about $1,000 
l Ease of use  
l Maintenance – free operation  
 
     These benefits were the basis on which an engineering task force examined the 
feasibility of the concept.  The engineering team had to evaluate disposable cartridges, 
instant toner fusers, and other components to reduce current copier price by a factor of 50 
percent and increase current copier reliability by a factor of 10. 
     By September 1980, a companywide taskforce parallel to the engineering taskforce 
was formed.  It was headed by Tanaka,  who had become the product champion.  This 
taskforce consisted of more than 200 people working in more than 23 groups drawn from 
many horizontal functional and business lines at Canon: marketing, production, 
engineering, design, optics, cameras, copiers, quality, costs, and even legal.  To generate 
enthusiasm among the taskforce and mobilize the entire company behind the development  
process, Tanaka used the slogan, “Let’s make the AE-1 of copiers.” 
     This taskforce, the second largest ever assembled at Canon, was divided into 
subgroups and smaller teams.  A development and design group was divided into seven 
teams (such as the toner development team) and a production group was divided into 10 
teams (such as the plastic molding team).  Six othe r teams were also included in 
supporting roles: a steering committee, a cost team, a quality team, a patents team, a 
marketing team, and a user application software team.  Clearly, effective communication 
among the various teams was essential for success. 
     If feasible, the smaller teams worked parallel with each other.  For instance, while 
the design team was working on the functional aspects of the new product, another team 
was investigating the feasibility of new materials and components.  Because the small, 
informal subteam interacted frequently, many issues were resolved before they became 
problems.  For instance, in its effort to design a global product, Canon faced the dilemma 
of whether to use the A4 paper size (used in the United States and Europe) or the B4 paper 
size (used in Japan).  An innovative, yet low cost, compromise solution was eventually 
reached that promised to make the new product globally appealing: the copier would use 
A4 paper size, but would also have a special facility to copy business cards, which are used 
in large numbers in Japan. 
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     The taskforce faced two major hurdles: (1) providing reliability within tight  
cost/price limits and (2) circumventing the “Xerox wall,” or Xerox’s tight patent protection 
on many aspects of copier technology.  Xerox also had a strong hold on dealerships and 
salesforces.  Because Canon wanted to sell the personal copiers in all markets, large 
geographic region.  Because of the low volume of copying in the target segment, 
absorbing this service cost would be difficult for Canon.  Therefore, an absolute 
requirement for the new copier was high reliability, with no breakdowns and no need for 
service.  Similarly, it was absolutely necessary for Canon to develop its own proprietary 
technology.  
     These issues led to the process of “inverted thinking,” which Canon managers 
defined as planning from scratch when left with no options.  For example, studying the 
causes of copier troubles, Canon discovered that 90 percent of them involve the drum.  
This finding led to a major concept change and the genesis of the disposable cartridge.  
With disposability, the problem–causing part would be discarded after a certain number of 
copies, thus making the copier essentially maintenance free.  Similarly, Canon realized 
that it could neutralize Xerox’s distribution strength by selling the new copiers through 
totally different channels: office product retailers and mail-order catalogs. 
     Although the actual development process was much more detailed and 
comprehensive than described here, its major features included: 
 
l A product champion supported by top managers; 
l An integrated taskforce, using interpersonal communication as a means of  
    technology transfer; 
l The use of parallel development wherever possible; 
l Deliberate attempts to create energy and enthusiasm;   
l Quality and cost goals incorporated in the earliest stages and used as key  
    criteria in the major go/ no-go decisions at each phase of development; 
l Extensive prototype development; and 
l Extensive product testing 
 
The outcome was a new personal copier that met all of its design criteria and top 
management expectations. 
     The PC copiers were “new” products in many respects: features, performance, 
physical characteristics, and technology.  Two models were developed, both plain paper 
copiers capable of producing up to eight copies a minute.  The PC-10 was the base model, 
priced at $995, and the PC-20 was an advanced model with automatic paper feeding (but 
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identical to the PC-10 in every other way), priced at $1,295.  Smaller than an electric 
typewriter and weighing less than 45 pounds, the Canon PC copiers became the most 
compact, lightweight, and inexpensive copiers in the world.  Not only had Canon 
achieved its goals, but with its new product development process beat all major 
competitors into the personal copier market. 
 
 
3-4.  Market Entry 
     The taskforce delivered the PC copiers within a three-year development time.  
Canon introduced them into the market by the end of 1982.  They were first launched in 
Japan, and then a month later in the United States and Europe.  Prior to the launch, Canon 
organized two major conferences for its salesforce and retailers to educate them about the 
product. 
     Canon supported its launch of the PC copies with a high profile media campaign, 
especially in the United States.  Taking the communications strategy used in the 
successful launch of the AE-1 as a model, the company spent almost $15 million in the 
United States and $1.5 million in Japan during 1983 for television advertising.   
Television was selected because the target markets of professionals and small-office 
personnel were not concentrated in geographic location or media usage habits.  In fact, 
during 1983, Canon became the single largest TV advertisement in the United States.  In 
Europe, television was not used as extensively because of the lower penetration rate of TV 
sets and the relatively in three major global market areas (United States, Europe, and 
Japan), primarily in business, general, and lifestyle publications such as Fortune, Business 
Week, The Economist, and Time.  Canon also advertised in many in –flight airline 
magazines.  Across all of these linguistically and culturally different media environments, 
Canon attempted to develop a clear and common communication strategy: it emphasized 
the personal, simple, reliable, affordable, and fun nature of the PC-10 and PC-20 copiers. 
 
3-5.  Reasons For Success 
     The success of the Canon PC copiers was swift and long lasting.  The most obvious 
reasons for their resounding success was that Canon: 
       
l Substantial shared corporate resources available to their business 
l Recognized a growing market opportunity; 
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l Set clear objectives and goals; 
l Capitalized on its entrepreneurial corporate culture and flexible organizational 
structure to facilitate the flow of ideas, resource sharing, and a quick response 
to the external environment; 
l Developed and exploited its technological strengths; and  
l Recognized a weakness in its marketing area and overcame it through  
    experience gained from its AE-1 new product success. 
 
However, underlying these reasons are Canon’s fundamental attitude toward innovation.  
Many organizations, for a variety of apparently logical reasons, are resistant to new product 
development projects. Its personnel is stimulated to rise to new challenges, especially those 
presented to them by leadership.  The corporate philosophy of Canon is Kosei, which 
means ‘living and working together for the company good’.20  This guiding philosophy 
has been clearly communicated to each employee and is engraved on the façade of 
corporate headquarters.  Consequently, when given a challenge to develop a personal 
copier with certain characteristics, everyone worked cooperatively to meet it. 
     Cooperation involved the formation of many teams on all aspects of the project, 
some working parallelly and some depending on the work of others.  Parallel 
development teams can accelerate a development process because one group does not have 
to wait for another to finish its work.  If the groups communicate effectively, they can 
expedite the identification and resolution of difficult development problems. 
     A product champion was instrumental in effectively communicating top managers’ 
vision of the new product concept to all teams.  He continually motivated and inspired  
participants to achieve clearly stated goals and objectives.  He also included as many 
young people as possible in the various task groups, especially at the early stages of 
development, to stimulate creativity and new ideas to solve difficult problems. 
     The clarity and integrity of the new product concept were instrumental in 
maintaining effective communication among various groups that were approaching the 
problem from different functional perspectives.  Marketing personnel would see the 
problem in different terms than R&D engineers; both would see the problem in different 
terms than production managers; and so on.  A clear product concept that can be 
understood by all participants tremendously improves communication. 
 
3-6.  Conclusion 
     The launch of the PC copiers was a major milestone for Canon.  Not only were 
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these products successful, but the know-how obtained during the course of their 
development helped Canon establish a technology platform on which to build other new 
products in the future.  
     The elements of Canon ‘s core competence are listed as (Table 1) which led the 
company to succeed from camera to copier. 
The first core competence was the fine optics technique. Canon developed new techniques 
in the copier market with the optics technique accumulated in camera. 
     Second, the most important Canon’s core competence was the precision mechanism 
technique. As Canon proceeded to another business applying their optical technology, 
Canon made a growth applying precision mechanism technique which is necessary for 
producing camera to the related business. We can say that the drum of copier and printer 
engine of laser printer are the core components which was developed in the basis of the 
precision mechanism technology.  
     Third, the final core competence of Canon was the micro electronics technique. They 
developed the copier which was controlled by the micro processor for the first time in the 
world. As a result, the copier is not more simple, mechanically operating machine, but 
became to have the skills to reduce, enlarge, and to indicate errors. This show us that the 
Canon has developed new products continuously with the mixture of precision mechanism 
technology, optics technology and micro electronics technology 
     The success of the PC copiers enabled Canon to dominate the small office/home 
office market segment for many years.  Strategically, these products helped Canon reduce 
its dependency on its camera business, and helped it to become a truly global company. 
(Table 2)  For example, to reduce costs and maintain adequate margins in the personal 
copier business in an increasingly competitive environment, Canon moved many of its 
production and sourcing activities overseas (to Germany, France, the United States, and 
Taiwan). 
     Finally, the success of products, such as the PC copiers and the AE-1 cameras, 
demonstrated to employees that Canon’s special philosophy of doing business with the 
individuals in mind can work well and provide benefits to all.  The result is high 
employee morale, willingness to work together on future projects (i.e., less resistance to 
innovation), and evidence that new product development can be an important part of the 
organization’s continuous process of renewal. 
 
Ⅳ. Conclusion 
 
     This research examined the concept and methodology of core competence 
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management to survive and grow in the 21st century.  This report is based on related 
literature, case analysis, personal experiences.  The upcoming business environment of 
the 21st century will have no boundary dividing the domestic and foreign market. Just by 
having competitive position without any concentrated investment, or by simply introducing 
a new management technique, the company can’t keep the predominant position 
continuously. 
     When the company applies core competence in management, it helps diversification 
into new fields, it leads the activation of the organization, it accelerates the company’s 
globalization, it maintains competitiveness, it allows the company to concentrate on R & D, 
it allows the company to select strategic alliance, and it unites the goals of strategic 
business divisions and those of the whole company.  Core competence is indispensable for  
successful diversification, and companies need to strengthen their core competence 
continuously.. 
     Companies will attain a preeminent the position like Canon if they develop 
diversification strategies based on core competence.  Korean companies with various 
businesses should attempt to restructure their businesses by focusing on their core 
competence to overcome the IMF crisis. If we take a look at the world market, the 
competitiveness of Korean companies is much lower than that of global leaders.  It is also 
impossible to raise the level of all the businesses up to the world’s standard at the same 
time given the limitation of resources. Accordingly, the most urgent task for a company is 
to identify their the core competence and to restructure their businesses based on it.  
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Table 1.   Canon’s Core Competencies and Core Products 
    
 Precision Fine Micro- 
 Mechanics Optics Electronics 
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Basic camera ■ ■  
Compact fashion camera ■ ■  
Electronic camera ■ ■  
EOS autofocus camera ■ 
 ■ ■ 
Video still camera ■ ■ ■ 
Laser beam printer ■ ■ ■ 
Color video printer ■  ■ 
Bubble Jet printer ■  ■ 
Basic fax ■  ■ 
Laser fax ■  ■ 
Calculator   ■ 
Plain paper copier ■ ■ ■ 
Battery PPC ■ ■ ■ 
Color copier ■ ■ ■ 
Laser copier ■ ■ ■ 
Color laser copier ■ ■ ■ 
NAVI ■ ■ ■ 
Still video system ■ ■ ■ 
Laser imager ■ ■ ■ 
Cell analyzer ■ ■ ■ 
Mask aligners ■  ■ 
Stepper aligners ■  ■ 
Eximer laser aligners ■ ■ ■ 
Source : C.K Prahalad and Gary Hamel. “The Core Competence of the Corporation”,  Harvard Business  
       Review, May-June 1990. 
Table 2. Canon-Sales by Product (Millions of Yen) 
 
Year Cameras  Copiers  
Other 
Business 
Optical & 
Other Products  
Total 
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Machines 
1981 201,635 175,389 52,798 40,222 470,044 
1982 224,619 242,161 67,815 45,905 580,500 
1983 219,443 291,805 97,412 48,665 657,325 
1984 226,645 349,986 180,661 73,096 830,388 
1985 197,284 410,840 271,190 76,466 955,780 
1986 159,106 368,558 290,630 70,923 889,217 
1987 177,729 393,581 342,895 62,506 976,711 
1988 159,151 436,924 434,624 75,301 1,106,010 
1989 177,597 533,115 547,170 93,035 1,350,917 
1990 250,494 686,077 676,095 115,282 1,727,948 
 
 Source: Canon Annual Report, 1981-1990 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
